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Abstract We propose to supplement the democratic election mechanism by thresh-
old contracts. A threshold contract stipulates a performance level that a politician must
reach in order to obtain the right to stand for reelection. “Read my lips” turns into
“read my contract”. Politicians can offer threshold contracts during their campaigns.
Equilibrium threshold contracts are welfare improving and do not violate the liberal
principle of free and anonymous elections in democracies.
1 Introduction
Democracies are—and should be—built on the fundamental principles of free and
anonymous elections. Consequently, future reelection is uncertain. For instance, highly
competent challengers may emerge at the reelection stage, thus lowering politicians’
reelection chances even if they have performed well in the past. Newly emerging issues
during campaigns may also influence voting behavior. The randomness of a politician’s
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reelection chances increases further when the benefits from the politician’s efforts can-
not be observed with sufficient precision, or when benefits are affected by external
shocks. Consider a reform of the judiciary system as an example for the former case,
or a labor market reform as an example for the latter case.1
Uncertainty in future reelections may not provide politicians with sufficient moti-
vation to exert a socially desirable amount of effort, as good performance may not
secure reelection. In this paper we show that adding a threshold contract to the elec-
tion mechanism can increase social welfare without undermining the liberal principles
of free and anonymous voting in democracies. A threshold contract stipulates the min-
imum performance level a politician must achieve in order to obtain the right to stand
for reelection. Thus, it penalizes low effort more heavily than the reelection mecha-
nism does and increases the marginal benefit of effort. The politician either reacts to
such threshold contracts by increasing effort to enhance his reelection chances, or he
does not find it worthwhile to meet the threshold and chooses zero effort. A suitable
design of the threshold contract can obviate the latter possibility and welfare may be
increased.
We consider a model in which an elected politician who is motivated by the pros-
pect of holding office can exert effort on a public issue. The effort creates benefits
for the public which are affected by noise, either due to measurement problems or to
shocks. The politician’s reelection chances are determined by a mixture of backward-
and forward-looking voting behavior. Hence, the reelection decision does not only
depend on the effort exerted by the politician and consequently the reelection mech-
anism does not provide him with sufficient motivation to exert the socially optimal
amount of effort. We allow a court to stipulate a threshold contract that the politician
must accept upon election. This contract prescribes a performance level the politician
must achieve in order to earn the right to stand for reelection. We show that optimally
designed threshold contracts can increase social welfare.
Subsequently we extend the model and allow politicians to offer the threshold con-
tracts themselves during their campaigns. We show that optimal contracts are offered
provided the politicians have the same competence, which is measured by the mar-
ginal costs of exerting effort. If the politicians differ in competence, then a second-best
contract is offered, and the politician with the higher competence will be elected.
Our paper contains a proposal to supplement the election mechanism in democra-
cies by incentive contracts. While the initial literature (e.g., Gersbach 2002; Gersbach
and Liessem 2003) has examined incentive contracts prescribing utility or monetary
transfers after a politician has been reelected, we focus in this paper on thresholds for
reelection.2 Such threshold contracts do not violate the fundamental liberal principles
of free and anonymous elections in democracies, as voting behaviour is unrestricted.
Moreover, all individuals are eligible as candidates except the incumbent operating
1 The potential benefits in terms of reduction of unemployment rates can be thwarted by negative macro-
economic shocks, which may make it very difficult for voters to assess the effort exerted by the politician
pursuing such reforms.
2 While in our paper we combine threshold contracts for politicians with the democratic requirements of
free and anonymous elections, there is a rapidly growing range of literature on incentive contracts for central
bankers where democratic requirements play no role. This was initiated by Walsh (1995a,b), and developed
by Persson and Tabellini (1993), Lockwood (1997), Svensson (1997) and Jensen (1997).
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under a threshold contract who may face a term limit if he does not meet the thresh-
old.3 A comprehensive presentation of the ideas, chances, and problems of incentive
contracts for politicians can be found in Gersbach (2005).
There are various well-known situations where threshold contracts could have been
applied. When US President George Bush senior announced “read my lips: no new
taxes”, threshold contracts would not have allowed him to abandon his campaign prom-
ise and then stand for reelection. Another recent example materialized in the election
campaign in Germany in 1998. Chancellor Schröder’s campaign promise included
a decrease in the unemployment level to 3.5 million by 2002. A threshold contract
would have caused Schröder either to forgo such promises or to keep to them in order
to stand for reelection as he did in 2002. In Sect. 9 we will discuss in more detail how
threshold contracts might be applied in practice.
The paper is related to the literature about electoral accountability initiated by Barro
(1973) and Ferejohn (1986) and extended by Persson et al. (1997) (see Persson and
Tabellini (2000) for surveys). There, elections are a means by which voters can control
a politician’s misbehavior, since the possibility of reelection may induce self-inter-
ested politicians to act on behalf of the electorate. We consider a hierarchical control
system: threshold contracts and elections.
The paper is organized as follows: in Sect. 2, we outline the model. Section 3
presents the first-best solution. In Sect. 4, we show how the reelection mechanism
functions. In Sect. 5 we add the threshold contract to the reelection mechanism and
indicate the welfare implications. Section 6 gives an example of how the threshold
contract works. Section 7 discusses what happens if the politicians themselves offer
threshold contracts at the campaign stage. In Sect. 8, we discuss ways to endogenize
the reelection scheme of the public. In Sect. 9, we suggest steps toward a practical
implementation of threshold contracts and we discuss other possible types of threshold
contracts. Sect. 10 presents our conclusions.
2 The model
We consider a simple political agency problem. The voters and the politician are
assumed to be risk-neutral. There are two periods. In the first period, the incumbent
has to exert effort e on a task T , which for example could be the reform of the judiciary
system. The effort e on task T creates benefits B for the public in the first period.4 For
simplicity, we assume
B = e. (1)
The voters cannot observe B directly; instead, they receive a noisy signal about the
benefits. This refers to a situation where the benefits of political actions are not easily
measurable. For example, if the politician works on the reform of the judiciary system,
the benefits are widespread and cannot be identified in simple quantitative terms. We
3 For discussions of constitutional and unconditional term limits see Carey et al. (2000), Dick and Lott
(1993) and Petracca (1992). For dynamic models on the relative performance of term limits see Akemann
and Kanczuk (1999).
4 Additional benefits may also materialize in the second period, but this has no bearing on our main results.
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assume the benefit signal to be given as
s = B +  = e + . (2)
Factor  is a random variable with the support [−a, a] distributed with the density
function f (). We assume E() to be zero. Hence, the benefit signal s is distributed
with the continuously differentiable density function f (s) = f (e+) on [e−a, e+a].
The expected utility for the public is denoted by U P . Upon observing s, U P is
given as
U P = E(B | s) (3)
where the expectation is evaluated after s has been observed.
An alternative interpretation of our model would be that the public does not per-
ceive a signal about their benefits, but that the benefits themselves are affected by an
external shock. This would describe, for example, a situation in which a politician
exerts effort on a labor market reform, but the benefits of the effort are affected by
macroeconomic shocks. In this case, s stands for the benefits for the public.
The main assumption of our model is that the election decision of voters is affected
by many—also forward-looking—criteria and thus, that they do not use an ex ante
optimal cutoff rule when they decide on the reelection of an incumbent. In order
to formalize this assumption we work with a general and flexible reelection scheme.
Hence, we assume that the politician’s reelection probability can be expressed by some
probability function p(s) that is known by the politician at the beginning of the first
period. p(s) is the probability that the politician will be reelected if the benefit signal
s is realized. We assume that p(s) is continuous in the effort signal and continuously
differentiable in the range where 0 < p(s) < 1.5 Moreover, the reelection probability
is assumed to be monotonically increasing in s with support [s, s¯]. For s < s the
reelection probability is assumed to be zero, for s > s¯ the reelection probability is
one.
To focus on the functioning of threshold contracts, we work with a given stochastic
reelection scheme throughout the paper. Specific examples for p(s) can be justified
as the voters’ best response to the politician’s choice of effort in an extended version
of our model. We discuss how p(s) can be endogenized in Sect. 8.
The utility of the politician is given by
U A(e) = W1 + q{e | p(·)}W2 − C(e). (4)
W1 denotes the utility of the office in period 1, W2 the discounted utility of the office in
period 2. The function q{e|p(·)} denotes the politician’s perceived reelection proba-
bility if he exerts the effort level e and the reelection scheme p(s) holds. For simplicity
of exposition, we denote the reelection probability q{e|p(·)} as q(e). Then the overall
expected utility of office in period 2 is given by q(e)W2. The function C(e) captures
5 By using the Lesbesque integral approach, our considerations can be applied to cutoff rules and thus
discontinuous voting rules that are ex ante inefficient. An example of such inefficient cutoff rules is the
retention rule developed in Banks and Sundaram (1998) which we will discuss in Sect. 8.
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the cost of exerting the effort. The outside option of the politician is normalized to
zero. For tractability, the cost C(e) of the politician is assumed to be given as follows:
C(e) = ce2. (5)
The factor c can be interpreted in two ways. Either it measures the politician’s dis-
inclination to provide the effort e, or it could be interpreted as the competence of
the politician, with small c meaning high competence, i.e., achieving a certain bene-
fit level does not require much expense of effort from the politician. The utility from
holding office may include monetary benefits, such as a fixed wage, and non-monetary
benefits, such as prestige or the desire for a statesman-like image.
The utility W1 from holding office in the first period is independent of the effort
choice. Accordingly, it will be neglected in the subsequent analysis. The remaining
utility takes the form
U A(e) = q(e)W2 − C(e). (6)
Given the politician’s utility, the participation constraint (PC) that the politician
wants to stand for reelection amounts to
q(e)W2 − C(e) ≥ 0. (7)
The politician chooses an effort level that maximizes his utility. Thus, the incentive
constraint (IC) is given as
e = arg max
e
{q(e)W2 − C(e)}. (8)
In order to break ties, we assume that a politician who is indifferent between actions
will choose the one that yields the highest utility for the voters.
The overall game is summarized as follows:
Stage 1: Based on his expected reelection chances q(e), the politician exerts his
effort on task T .
Stage 2: The benefit from the politician’s activity is realized. The public observes
the benefit signal s and makes its reelection decision.
3 First-best solution
We first describe the first-best solution. We assume that the public has perfect informa-
tion about the politician’s effort. Furthermore, the public can impose the exertion of a
certain effort level on the politician by designing a contract that heavily penalizes any
deviation from a prescribed effort level. If the politician selects the prescribed effort,
his remuneration is equal to the benefits W2 he would receive in the second term.
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To determine the first-best solution the public has to maximize its utility subject to
the politician’s participation constraint.6 The participation constraint must be honored
by the public, otherwise the politician would resign and leave office.
The perfect information assumption yields
U P = B. (9)
Hence, the voters’ problem is given by
max{U P = e}, (10)
s.t. W2 − C(e) ≥ 0,
e ≥ 0.
From W2 = ce2 we immediately obtain
Proposition 1 The first-best effort level is given by
eF B =
√
W2
c
. (11)
This is the maximum effort level the public can implement. Higher effort levels
would not satisfy the participation constraint, and the politician would not accept the
contract.7
4 The reelection mechanism
4.1 Effort levels
In this section, we explore the equilibria of the game if only the reelection mechanism
is at work. Since p(s) is given, an equilibrium is simply the optimal effort choice of
the politician. The politician chooses his effort according to the incentive constraint
(IC) as
e = arg max
e
{q(e)W2 − ce2}.
The expected reelection probability q(e) is given by
q(e) =
e+a∫
e−a
p(s) f (s − e)ds =
+a∫
−a
p(e + ) f ()d. (12)
6 We do not include the utility of the politician in social welfare because we consider elections in a large
population.
7 Note that the first-best solution can also be implemented if the public could commit to a reelection scheme
at the beginning of the first term and effort is perfectly observable (see Ferejohn 1986). We exclude the idea
that voters can precommit to a reelection rule; hence voting behavior must be sequentially rational.
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Note that p(s) is zero for s < s and reelection is certain for s ≥ s¯. Therefore the
expected reelection probability q(e) has different forms for the cases e − a < s,
e − a > s, etc., which we will address when necessary. We thus obtain
Proposition 2 Under the reelection scheme p(s) only three types of solutions can
occur:
(i) e = 0 (lower corner solution),
(ii) e = s¯ + a (upper corner solution)
(iii) e = ∂q(e)
∂e
W2
2c (interior solutions).
The proof is given in the Appendix.
Note that interior solutions can only be characterized implicitly. We assume that at
least one interior solution exists.8 Among the possible solutions, the politician selects
the one that maximizes his utility. Let e∗ be the solution of the politician’s maximiza-
tion problem, i.e., the global maximum
e∗ = arg max{U A(e)}.
4.2 Efficiency considerations
In the following, we discuss the efficiency or inefficiency of the various solutions.
Obviously the lower corner solution is the worst in terms of welfare.
4.2.1 The upper corner solution
If the politician chooses the upper corner solution, the first-best solution is imple-
mented provided that s¯ = eF B − a. Since W2 = C(eF B) = ceF B 2, the first-best
solution requires a reelection probability of one, otherwise the PC would be violated.
If s¯ = eF B − a then first-best cannot be obtained. Either the politician can secure
his reelection with an effort smaller than eF B (in the case where s¯ < eF B − a) or his
reelection probability is smaller than one if he exerts the socially desirable amount of
effort and thus his PC is violated (in the case where s¯ > eF B − a).
We next give the conditions that lead to the upper corner solution. For that purpose,
we label the effort levels of the interior or lower corner solutions by e j , j = 1, . . . , k.
Then the politician chooses the upper corner solution, provided
W2 − c(s¯ + a)2 ≥
e j +a∫
e j −a
p(s) f (s − e)dsW2 − c(e j )2 ≥ 0 for all j
8 The second-order condition is ∂
2q(e)
∂e2
W2 − 2c < 0.
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and thus if
⎛
⎜⎝1 −
e j +a∫
e j −a
p(s) f (s − e)ds
⎞
⎟⎠ W2 ≥ c(s¯ + a)2 − c(e j )2 ≥ 0 for all j.
Thus, for the politician to adopt the upper corner solution, the loss through higher
costs has to be outweighed by the gain in the expected reelection probability. The costs
of exerting the effort e = s¯ + a increase in a (the bounds of the density function of
the noise) and s¯. The gain in expected reelection probability is high if p(s) has a high
gradient.9
4.2.2 The interior solution
As interior solutions imply q(e) < 1, they cannot lead to the first-best effort level. We
briefly examine the characteristics of the interior solution.
To do this, we write the interior solution implicitly as
eint = ∂q(e)
∂e
W2
2c
=
∂
∫ a
−a
p(e + ) f ()d
∂e
W2
2c
.
Using the rules for differentiation of parameter integrals, this can be written as
eint =
a∫
−a
(
∂p(e + )
∂e
∣∣
e=eint
)
f ()d W2
2c
. (13)
Throughout the paper we assume that Eq. (13) has a finite number of solutions. The
implicit Eq. (13) exhibits intuitive comparative statics if we assume in addition that
the interior solution is unique. A sufficient condition for a unique interior solution is,
for instance, that q(e)W2 − ce2 is concave on [0,∞) and that ∂q(e)∂e |e=0 > 0. In this
case, eint increases the higher the gradient of the reelection scheme and the lower the
variance of the benefit signal is. Additionally, the effort level in the interior solution
depends in an intuitive way on the benefits of holding office and on the costs of exerting
effort.
5 Reelection threshold contracts
In this section, we investigate whether the introduction of a threshold contract leads to
a superior outcome. We assume that there is an independent institution, for example
a court, that has the same utility function as the voters and the right to design and to
9 Moreover, one can show that the gain is high, and thus the corner solution is more likely to be adopted,
when the benefit signal has a small variance.
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execute the threshold contract. The design of the threshold contract and its execution is
given as follows: The court announces a threshold value denoted by sˆ at the beginning
of the first period. If the benefit signal realized at the end of the first period is lower
than sˆ, the politician is not allowed to stand for reelection. If the benefit signal realized
is equal to or higher than sˆ, the politician is allowed to stand for reelection. Then
the democratic election process with free and anonymous voting takes place. Thus, a
hierarchy of threshold contracts and elections is formed. First, the decision is taken as
to whether the politician has the right to stand for reelection, then voting takes place.
The overall game is summarized as follows:
Stage 1: A court dictates a threshold value sˆ that the politician must reach if he wants
to stand for reelection. The required value is known to the politician. Voters
have a stochastic reelection scheme p(s).
Stage 2: The politician exerts his effort on task T .
Stage 3: The benefit from the politician’s activity is realized. The public and the
court observe the benefit signal s. If s < sˆ, the politician has to leave office.
If s ≥ sˆ the politician is allowed to stand for reelection and reelection takes
place.
When the threshold contract is at work and the court announces sˆ, the expected
reelection probability for a given effort changes to
q(e, sˆ) =
e+a∫
e−a
p(s) f (s − e)ds −
sˆ∫
e−a
p(s) f (s − e)ds. (14)
The last term measures the decline of the expected reelection probability due to the
threshold contract. If e − a < sˆ, then q(e, sˆ) < q(e), because the expected reelec-
tion probability for some signals is now zero. In this case, the expected reelection
probability can be directly written as
q(e, sˆ) =
e+a∫
sˆ
p(s) f (s − e)ds. (15)
The utility for the politician with the threshold contract associated with sˆ is denoted
by U A(e, sˆ) and is given by
U A(e, sˆ) = q(e, sˆ)W2 − ce2.
We now explore the consequences of the threshold contract. First, we examine how
effort levels under the IC are affected. In the next step, we derive the optimal threshold
contract. Then we characterize the conditions in which the threshold contract strictly
improves welfare.
Proposition 3 For an appropriate choice of sˆ the threshold contract weakly increases
the effort levels chosen under the incentive constraint.
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The proof is given in the Appendix.
The proposition indicates that the threshold contract increases the upper corner
solution and the interior solutions, provided an adequate threshold value is stipulated.
In the upper corner solution, the effort level is raised by choosing a threshold value
sˆ > s¯. In this case, the effort level which ensures reelection is given by e = sˆ + a.
For the interior solutions, the effort level can be increased by choosing a threshold
value sˆ = eint − a + ξ with ξ sufficiently small. In this case, the cutoff of the reelec-
tion probability in the presence of threshold contracts increases marginal reelection
chances and thus the marginal utility from exerting effort. This is the main effect
thresholds to reelection should achieve.
Note that this does not imply that the chosen effort increases for an arbitrary thresh-
old value sˆ. For instance if sˆ is very high, the politician would choose the lower corner
solution, since he would suffer very high cost if he wants to have a chance to get
reelected.
We now examine what threshold value sˆ should be required by the court in order
to obtain a second-best solution. We denote the possible corner and interior solutions
under the threshold contract by e j (sˆ), j = 1, ...., k. Let e∗(sˆ) be the solution of the
politician’s maximization problem, i.e., the global maximum
e∗(sˆ) = arg max{U A(e j (sˆ), sˆ)}. (16)
Note that e∗(−a) is equal to the effort level e∗ chosen when only the reelection mech-
anism is at work. We state
Proposition 4 The court chooses the threshold value sˆ∗ as
sˆ∗ = arg max{e∗(sˆ)} s.t. U A(e∗(sˆ∗), sˆ∗) ≥ 0.
The proof is given in the Appendix.
In the next two propositions, we establish sufficient conditions for the threshold
contract to strictly improve welfare.
Proposition 5
(i) If U A(e∗(−a)) = 0, then e∗(sˆ∗) = e∗(−a);
(ii) If U A(e∗(−a)) > 0 and e∗(−a) = eint(−a), then e∗(sˆ∗) > e∗(−a).
The proof is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 6 Suppose that U A(e∗(−a)) > 0 and ξ is arbitrarily small. Then
(a) e∗(sˆ∗) > e∗(−a) if e∗(−a) = 0 and p(a) f (a) − ∫ a−a+ξ p() f ′()d ≥ 0;
(b) e∗(sˆ∗) > e∗(−a) if e∗(−a) = s¯ + a and
p(a) f (a)W2 −
∫ a
−a+ξ p(s¯ + a + ) f ′()dW2 − 2c(s¯ + a) ≥ 0.
The proof is given in the Appendix.
In the proofs we show that the threshold contract strictly improves social welfare
if U A(e∗(−a)) > 0 and e∗(−a) is an interior solution. Given certain conditions,
the threshold contract also improves social welfare if e∗(−a) is one of the corner
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solutions and U A(e∗(−a)) > 0. The reasoning for the interior solution is as follows:
U A(e∗(−a)) > 0 is a necessary condition for the PC to be satisfied in a solution
e∗(sˆ) > e∗(−a). Moreover, it is always possible to set a threshold value sˆ in such
a way that q(e∗(−a), sˆ) < q(e∗(−a),−a) and that the politician does not choose a
lower effort level than e∗(−a). Then, as we recall from Proposition 3, the effort in the
interior solution is increased due to the increasing marginal utility. The reasoning for
the corner solutions is similar if the conditions of Proposition 6 are fulfilled. Note that
a negative impact of threshold contracts can always be avoided by setting sˆ = −a.
In the following, we describe situations where threshold contracts lead to signifi-
cant welfare improvement. Without further specifications of the reelection probability
p(s) and the density function f (s) this can only be carried out in a very general way.
For a specific example see Sect. 6.
Social welfare is maximal if the first-best effort level can be reached. This is possi-
ble if the threshold value can be set as sˆ = eF B −a ≥ s¯ and the politician chooses the
upper corner solution. Generally, there are two ways in which the threshold contract
can increase social welfare in connection with the upper corner solution. Firstly, it can
increase the effort in the upper corner solution when eF B −a > s¯ is satisfied. Secondly,
it could induce a switch from one of the interior solutions to the upper corner solution.
To illustrate the latter case, suppose there is an interior solution e1(−a) and the upper
corner solution is e2(−a). Suppose further that U A(e1(−a)) > U A(e2(−a)), but the
utility difference is small. Then there is a possibility that the threshold contract will
change utility in such a way that U A(e2(sˆ)) > U A(e1(sˆ)). Accordingly, the politician
will choose the upper corner solution.
Regarding the interior solutions, social welfare can be strictly improved by the
threshold contract in two ways: First, as we have seen in Proposition 3, the effort can
be continuously increased; second, the threshold contract can induce a switch from
one interior solution to another, following the same logic as above.
In the next section, we give an example illustrating how threshold contracts work.
6 Example
We illustrate the functioning of the dual mechanism of elections and threshold con-
tracts with a simple example. We assume that a = 0 and thus the politician’s effort is
perfectly observable by the public, i.e., s = e.
As before, the first-best solution is given by
e =
√
W2
c
.
Further, we assume the reelection mechanism p(s) is given as
p(s) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 for s ≤ s,
γ + φs for s ≤ s ≤ s¯,
1 for s ≥ s¯,
with s¯ ≤ eF B , s ≥ 0, γ + φs = 0 and γ + φs¯ = 1.
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As the politician’s effort and benefits are perfectly observable, we have q(e) = p(s).
According to the incentive constraint of the politician, three solutions are possible:
(i) e = 0 (lower corner solution),
(ii) e = s¯ (upper corner solution),
(iii) eint = φ W22c if s ≤ φ
W2
2c < s¯ (interior solution).
Note that for the interior solution we have
∂2U A
∂e2
= −2c < 0,
and hence eint is indeed a maximum. The upper corner solution e = s¯ is only chosen
for φW22c ≥ s¯.10 Furthermore, the lower corner solution e = 0 is chosen if the PC is not
satisfied for any effort level greater than e = 0. In all other cases, the politician chooses
eint. Obviously, the probability that φW22c ≥ s¯ and that the politician will provide an
effort s¯ increases with φ.
We now introduce the threshold contract.
A court announces a threshold value sˆ, which the politician must achieve in order
to obtain the right to stand for reelection. Then the politician’s reelection probability
becomes
q(e, sˆ) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 for s ≤ max[s, sˆ],
γ + φs for max[s, sˆ] ≤ s ≤ s¯,
1 for s ≥ max[s¯, sˆ].
The politician chooses his effort according to the modified incentive constraint, which
now amounts to
e = arg max{q(e, sˆ)W2 − ce2}.
The possible solutions, i.e. the possible utility maxima, are given as
(i) e = 0 (lower corner solution),
(ii) e = max{s¯, sˆ} (upper corner solution),
(iii) eint(sˆ) = max{φ W22c , sˆ} if φ
W2
2c ≤ s¯ (interior solution).
We use e∗(sˆ) to denote the global utility maximum and hence the effort that the
politician chooses under the threshold contract.
In order to derive the optimal threshold value sˆ∗, we must ensure that sˆ∗ maximizes
the chosen effort under the IC and that the PC is satisfied.
Thus, the optimal value sˆ∗ is chosen as sˆ∗ = arg max{e∗(sˆ)} s.t.U A(e∗(sˆ∗), sˆ∗)≥0.
Clearly, sˆ∗ = eF B is the solution. The politician will not choose an effort level lower
than eF B as this would prevent his reelection. The participation constraint is satisfied
10 The politician does not exert an effort level higher than s¯ because q(e) = 1 for all s ≥ s¯.
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because U A(eF B, eF B) = 0. According to our tie-breaking rule, the politician chooses
eF B and not e = 0.
In this example, the threshold contract always leads to the first-best solution. Thus,
it is welfare-improving if the politician chooses the interior solution under the reelec-
tion mechanism, or if s¯ < eF B and the politician chooses the upper corner solution
under the reelection mechanism.
Note that the assumption s¯ ≤ eF B is necessary because otherwise the reelection
probability under the first-best effort level is less than one and the PC would not be
satisfied. In this case, the optimal threshold value would satisfy U A(e∗(sˆ∗), sˆ∗) = 0
and would be second-best.
7 Campaigning with incentive contracts
In this section, we examine what occurs when politicians can offer the threshold value
sˆ themselves during a campaign. We assume that there is a campaign stage before the
first period in which two political candidates, denoted by i, j, offer threshold contracts
with values sˆi , sˆ j to the public that become effective upon election.
The costs of exerting effort (or of the competencies) of politicians i, j are denoted
by ci , c j and are assumed to be known to the voters.11 The offered threshold values
sˆi , sˆ j are associated with effort levels e∗i (sˆi ), e∗j (sˆ j ) that politicians i, j would exert in
office. Due to our complete information assumption, the voters can derive these effort
levels by observing sˆi , sˆ j .12
If the court designed the thresholds, it would choose the values sˆ∗i , sˆ∗j according to
the results in the previous section. They are associated with efforts e∗i (sˆ∗i ), e∗j (sˆ∗j ). In
this section, we ask which thresholds will be chosen by politicians when they compete
for office.
The voters observe the threshold offers and cast their votes. We assume that each
politician is elected with a probability of 1/2, if e∗i (sˆi ) = e∗j (sˆ j ) and ci = c j . If ci > c j
and e∗i (sˆi ) = e∗j (sˆ j ) we assume as a tie-breaking rule that politician j is elected with
probability 1.13 If e∗i (sˆi ) > e∗j (sˆ j ) then politician i is elected with probability 1.
The structure of the game is summarized as follows:
Stage 1: Two politicians denoted by i, j with competencies ci , c j offer threshold
contracts with values sˆi , sˆ j to the public.
Stage 2: The voters observe the threshold offers and make their election decisions.
Stage 3: The elected politician exerts his effort on task T .
Stage 4: The benefit from the politician’s activity is realized. The public observes
the benefit signal s. If s < sˆi , sˆ j respectively, the politician leaves office
and does not stand for reelection. If s ≥ sˆi , sˆ j respectively, the politician
stands for reelection.
11 Liessem (2007) examines the case of asymmetric information regarding preferences of candidates.
12 Note that the choice of effort and also the first-best effort levels depend on the competency of the
politician.
13 This tie-breaking rule is not crucial; it allows us to avoid the -framework in characterizing the equilibria.
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We now look for the sub-game perfect equilibria of the campaigning game.
Proposition 7
(i) If ci = c j , there exists a unique equilibrium in which both politicians offer the
threshold values sˆ∗i = sˆ∗j .
(ii) If ci > c j , there exists a unique equilibrium in which politician i offers the
threshold value sˆ∗i and politician j offers the threshold value sˆoj with
sˆoj = arg max
sˆ j
U A(e∗j (sˆ j ), sˆ j , c j ) s.t. e∗j (sˆoj ) ≥ e∗i (sˆ∗i ).
The proof is given in the Appendix.
In the proof we have shown that the politicians offer the optimal threshold contracts
if they are equally competent. However, if the politicians have different competencies,
inefficiencies will occur. If politician j has a higher competency than politician i , he
will offer at least a threshold value sˆ j that yields e∗j (sˆ j ) = e∗i (sˆ∗i ). Then, he will be
elected with certainty. The more competent politician obtains a rent that depends on
the degree of his superiority.
8 Extended games and endogenous reelection schemes
The main purpose of this paper is to introduce reelection threshold contracts as a
new idea into politics and to show that they lead to superior outcomes when election
decisions also depend on other factors than past performance. To model this case, we
assumed the continuous and monotonically increasing reelection probability function
p(s). This assumption can be justified empirically, as a wealth of research has shown
how voter opinion can shift over time (see for example, the comprehensive study
by Lupia and McCubbins 1998). For a theoretical justification of our approach, we
proceed in three steps.
First, we outline several extended games. Second, we argue that the ex-ante optimal
cutoff rule is not an equilibrium strategy in such games. Third, we discuss whether
the introduction of threshold contracts affects the voting behavior of the electorate at
the reelection stage.
Step 1:
We now sketch several extensions of our game. In all games, the public (or the
representative voter) is assumed to be long-lived, i.e. he lives during the entire game,
which can contain finitely or infinitely many periods. Moreover, in all games, there is
a moral hazard problem in each period, of the type described in our paper.14
• Long-lived politicians whose ability is unknown: Suppose we interpret the random
variable  as the realization of the ability of the office holder. This ability is unknown
when the politician chooses the effort level. Moreover, any challenger is subject to
the same uncertainty as to his ability.
14 The solution of the games sketched in this section (with and without threshold contracts) constitutes an
extensive research programme.
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• Short-lived politicians: Consider a finite or infinite period extension of our game
where politicians have two-period lives.
• Long-lived politicians—cost parameters of future challengers are random: Con-
sider a finite or infinite period extension of our game when the cost parameters of
the candidates competing for office are observable.
• Long-lived politicians—cost parameters of future challengers are random and
there is learning by doing: Consider the same game as before. In addition, we
allow for learning by doing, i.e., the future cost of efforts of an office holder is a
decreasing function of current effort levels.
Step 2:
We argue that in such games, the ex-ante optimal cutoff rule is typically not part of
an equilibrium or, if it is, there are other equilibria in which the voter’s equilibrium
strategy is not the ex-ante optimal cutoff rule. The ex-ante optimal cutoff rule is the one
which induces the politician to an effort choice such that his participation constraint
is binding.
We outline the argument in two cases. Consider the first game. In a stationary equi-
librium, an incumbent will be replaced by a new candidate if the benefit generated
by the incumbent is smaller than the benefit created by a new candidate with average
ability, who will exert the equilibrium level of effort. Hence, voters use a cutoff rule
in their equilibrium election decision which depends on the average ability of future
challengers. Thus, in general, the equilibrium cutoff rule differs from the ex-ante opti-
mal cutoff rule. Moreover, from the perspective of a politician starting his first term
in office, his expected reelection chances are an increasing and continuous function
of his chosen effort level.15
Consider as a second game the infinite extension of our game where politicians have
two-period lives. This is equivalent to a variant of the model of Banks and Sundaram
(1998) who study the optimal retention rule when agents have two-period lives and
work for a longer-lived principal. They show that the principal cannot credibly pro-
vide the incentive for agents to work hard in the first period. In particular, the ex-ante
optimal cutoff rule is no equilibrium voting behavior.
Step 3:
In the third step, we discuss whether the introduction of a threshold contract would
affect the expected reelection probability q(e, sˆ) that is based on p(s) and the thresh-
old sˆ. If we consider a once-only introduction of reelection threshold contracts, the
function p(s) may not change, as the continuation game is the same as when there are
no threshold contracts and p(s) remains an equilibrium voting behavior. If threshold
contracts are used for each term in extended games, p(s) may change, depending on
the particular game. Our analysis can be adapted to such cases by using the modified
probability function when we calculate the reelection chances of the incumbent and
sˆ. The court can always design a modified sˆ such that threshold contracts are weakly
welfare-improving.
15 Formal details of this argument are available upon request.
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To sum up, while we work here with the reduced game introduced above and allow
for arbitrary probability functions p(s), particular forms of p(s) can be endogenized
as an equilibrium response in more extended versions of our game.
9 Practical implementation and other types of threshold contracts
9.1 Practical implementation
The practical implementation of threshold contracts poses various challenges. We sug-
gest the following procedure. During campaigns, politicians running for the executive
branch are free to submit proposals for threshold contracts to an official body, e.g., to
a subgroup of the constitutional court at the state or county level, respectively. This
body, which may be a higher court, reviews the following conditions:
• Does the proposal for a political contract tie feasible policy projects to their out-
comes?
• Are the terms of the contract and its time-frame described in such a way that a
clear-cut answer is possible as to whether the contract has been fulfilled or not
when the contract is up for review, i.e., is the contract verifiable?
• Does the proposed contract respect the values of liberal democracy?
The certification authority will approve the proposals if and only if the answers to all
three questions are affirmative. A certified proposal will be published and will function
as a threshold contract. Hence, it will be completely left to politicians which type of
threshold contracts—if any—they intend to propose. Separation of power and political
opposition may induce politicians to be careful in designing their threshold contracts.
Moreover, they may wish to obtain the agreement of their party to create collective
responsibility for fulfilling the threshold contract.
Further practical issues must be taken into account. For instance, one could intro-
duce a clause which would lead to the cancellation or renegotiation of the contract
in the event of extraordinary circumstances such as a war. Cancellation of a certified
threshold contract could be possible if it is approved by a super majority of members
in the parliament.
Of course, our imagination may be insufficient to cover all aspects of how political
campaigns will change when threshold contracts are introduced. We might expect,
however, that such thresholds will improve communication between the public and
politicians in terms of credibility, a consequence which may be beneficial in its own
right.
9.2 Other types of threshold contracts
While we have focussed on threshold contracts that stipulate a performance level that
a politician must reach in order to obtain the right to stand for reelection, other types
of reelection contracts are conceivable, which are discussed in detail in Gersbach and
Mueller (2006) and Gersbach (2007). First, the threshold may be the price in an infor-
mation market that predicts the probability of the incumbent to get reelected in the
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next-but-one election. Such a mechanism allows to use threshold contracts in which
the performance signal is observable, but not verifiable.
Second, threshold contracts might be based on the actual outcome of the election
itself. For instance, an incumbent may face a vote-share threshold that stipulates a
vote share higher than one half which he must reach in order to get reelected. If the
incumbent does not obtain enough votes to fulfill the vote-share threshold, either his
challenger is elected or a run-off between two new candidates takes place. Such vote-
share thresholds make the election hurdle dependent on the number of terms in office.
This may curb the incumbency advantage, and may avoid that politicians remain in
office even if they lack motivation to work hard for the common welfare.
10 Conclusion
Our analysis suggests that thresholds to reelection could be a viable supplementary
mechanism for improving democratic procedures. There are, of course, a variety of
practical issues involved in using incentive contracts in politics as discussed in the last
section.
Moreover, the literature has identified a number of further inefficiencies in the polit-
ical system (see e.g., the surveys and contributions of Mueller 1989; Drazen 2000;
Dixit 1995; Buchanan and Tullock 1965; Stiglitz 1989; Persson and Tabellini 1990;
Persson and Tabellini 2000). Deliberating on how the dual mechanism of threshold
contracts and elections might be applied to these kinds of inefficiencies would be a
useful extension. Moreover, our model has been kept simple to introduce the basic
idea. It remains to be examined how threshold contracts affect outcomes in more
complicated political-economic models.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2 According to the IC, the politician chooses the effort level that
maximizes his utility under the reelection scheme p(s).
First, we observe U A(e) < U A(s¯ + a) for all e > s¯ + a. An effort level e = s¯ + a
guarantees reelection, because the benefit signal s¯ is reached with certainty. Clearly,
a politician will only provide the minimum effort level that will ensure his reelec-
tion. Any additional effort would only incur costs with no benefits. Therefore, we can
restrict the problem to
max
e
{U A(e)}; e ∈ [0; s¯ + a].
Either there is a corner solution, i.e., e = 0 or e = s¯ +a, or there are interior solutions.
In the interior solutions, the politician chooses his effort level according to the IC. The
first-order condition implies
∂q(e)
∂e
W2 − 2ce = 0,
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and the politician exerts the effort given by the implicit equation.16
e = ∂q(e)
∂e
W2
2c
.
unionsq
Proof of Proposition 3 First, we rewrite the politician’s maximization problem under
the hierarchy of threshold contracts and elections as
max
e
{U A(e, sˆ)}; e ∈ [0; max[s¯ + a, sˆ + a]]
As we have seen, there are three possibilities. The lower corner solution remains the
same with e = 0, but the upper corner solution becomes
e = sˆ + a
for sˆ > s¯. Hence, the effort level in the upper corner solution is higher with a threshold
contract, or remains the same in the case where sˆ ≤ s¯.
Regarding the interior solutions, the politician chooses his effort level according to
the new incentive constraint as
e = arg max{q(e, sˆ)W2 − ce2},
which yields the following effort level in the first order condition
eint(sˆ) = ∂q(e, sˆ)
∂e
W2
2c
.
This can be written as
eint(sˆ) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
∂q(e)
∂e
−
∂
[∫ sˆ
e−a
p(s) f (s − e)ds
]
∂e
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
W2
2c
.
Without a threshold contract the interior solutions were
eint = ∂q(e)
∂e
W2
2c
.
16 Note that multiple interior solutions as local maxima can exist without further assumptions regarding
q(e).
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The term
∂
[∫ sˆ
e−a
p(s) f (s − e)ds
]
∂e
can be written as
∂
∂e
sˆ−e∫
−a
p(e + ) f ()d ,
which yields
sˆ−e∫
−a
∂p(e + )
∂e
f ()d − p(sˆ) f (sˆ − e).
Suppose we start from a particular solution eint where no threshold contract is present.
If we set sˆ = eint −a +ξ for some ξ > 0, for e = eint the expression above amounts to
−a+ξ∫
−a
∂p(e + )
∂e
|e=eint f ()d − p(eint − a + ξ) f (−a + ξ).
For sufficiently small ξ the expression is negative since the integral term becomes
arbitrarily small. Hence, with e = eint and an appropriate choice of sˆ we have
eint <
∂q(eint, sˆ)
∂e
W2
2c
,
which implies that there exists a solution eint(sˆ) > eint for every solution eint we start
from.17 unionsq
Proof of Proposition 4 The optimal threshold value sˆ∗ should be chosen to maximize
the effort level e and thus maximize the benefits for the public.
e∗(sˆ) is the effort level that the politician chooses subject to the threshold value
sˆ. Hence, e∗(sˆ) must be maximized over sˆ. The participation constraint U A(e∗(sˆ∗),
sˆ∗) ≥ 0 has to be satisfied, otherwise the politician would not seek reelection. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 5 Proof of (i) Suppose U A(e∗(−a)) = 0. e∗(−a) maximizes the
utility under the reelection mechanism alone and thus
U A(e∗(−a)) ≥ U A(e) ∀e,
17 The latter follows from the fact that ∂q(e,sˆ)
∂e
is continuous and ∂q(e,sˆ)
∂e
|e=s¯+a = 0.
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and because of our tie-breaking rule
U A(e∗(−a)) > U A(e) for e > e∗(−a).
Then, if e∗(sˆ) > e∗(−a), the PC would be violated and the optimal threshold value is
set as sˆ∗ = −a.
Proof of (ii) According to our assumptions, the costs and q(e, sˆ) are continuous
in e and sˆ respectively. Hence, there exist δ > 0 and ξ > 0 small enough that
U A(e∗(−a) + δ,−a + ξ) ≥ 0. Thus, in principle it is possible to satisfy the PC if
effort and threshold value are marginally increased.
We proceed in two stages. First, we show that for U A(e∗(−a)) > 0 there always
exist threshold values sˆ with q(e∗(−a), sˆ) < q(e∗(−a),−a) for which the politician
does not choose a solution lower than e∗(−a). Then we show that the effort in the
interior solution can always be increased when U A(e∗(−a)) > 0.
We first show that for U A(e∗(−a)) > 0, there are always threshold values sˆ for
which the politician does not choose an effort level e < e∗(−a) under the threshold
contract.
The solution e∗(−a) satisfies U A(e∗(−a)) ≥ U A(e) for all e and thus
e∗(−a)+a∫
e∗(−a)−a
p(s) f (s − e)dsW2 − c(e∗(−a))2 ≥
e+a∫
e−a
p(s) f (s − e)dsW2 − ce2
for e∗(−a) = e.
Then, for the threshold value sˆ = e∗(−a) − a and for e < e∗(−a):
e∗(−a)+a∫
e∗(−a)−a
p(s) f (s − e)dsW2 − c(e∗(−a))2 >
e+a∫
e∗(−a)−a
p(s) f (s − e)dsW2 − ce2,
because the introduction of a threshold contract diminishes expected reelection prob-
ability and thus the utility for a given effort level.
Thus, threshold values sˆ = e∗(−a) − a + ξ with sufficiently small ξ exist, such
that for e < e∗(−a)
e∗(−a)+a∫
e∗(−a)−a+ξ
p(s) f (s − e)dsW2 − c(e∗(−a))2 ≥
e+a∫
e∗(−a)−a+ξ
p(s) f (s − e)dsW2 − ce2.
Accordingly, there exist threshold values with q(e∗(−a), sˆ) < q(e∗(−a)) for which
the politician does not choose an effort level lower than e∗(−a).
Suppose e∗(−a) = eint(−a), as assumed in the proposition. For a threshold value
ξ = e∗(−a) − a + ξ with ξ sufficiently small, the politician will still choose the inte-
rior solution as shown above. By using the construction and argument of Proposition 3,
the effort increases, i.e., e∗(sˆ) > e∗(−a). unionsq
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Proof of Proposition 6 We first show (a). Suppose e∗(−a) = 0. Then the effort can
be increased if there exists sˆ = −a + ξ , with ξ > 0 and ξ sufficiently small, and an
effort level δ > 0 such that
U A(0,−a + ξ) ≤ U A(δ,−a + ξ).
The condition can be rewritten as
a∫
−a+ξ
p(s) f (s)dsW2 ≤
δ+a∫
−a+ξ
p(s) f (s − δ)dsW2 − cδ2.
Thus, we obtain
δ+a∫
a
p(s) f (s − δ)dsW2 +
a∫
−a+ξ
p(s)[ f (s − δ) − f (s)]dsW2 − cδ2 ≥ 0.
This is equivalent to
a∫
a−δ
p(δ + ) f ()dW2 +
a−δ∫
−a+ξ−δ
p(δ + )[ f () − f ( + δ)]dW2 − cδ2 ≥ 0.
By taking the derivatives of the lefthand side at δ = 0 using the formula for parameter
integrals, we obtain a sufficient condition as
p(a) f (a) −
a∫
−a+ξ
p() f ′()d ≥ 0.
Next we prove (b).
Suppose e∗(−a) = s¯ + a. Then, the effort can be increased if for threshold values
sˆ = e∗(−a) − a + ξ , ξ > 0 and an effort level e∗(sˆ) = e∗(−a) + δ, δ > 0
U A(s¯ + a, e∗(−a) − a + ξ) ≤ U A(s¯ + a + δ, e∗(−a) − a + ξ).
The condition can be rewritten as
s¯+2a∫
s¯+ξ
p(s) f (s − (s¯ + a))dsW2 − c(s¯ + a)2
≤
s¯+δ+2a∫
s¯+ξ
p(s) f (s − (s¯ + a + δ))dsW2 − c(s¯ + a + δ)2.
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Thus we obtain
s¯+δ+2a∫
s¯+2a
p(s) f (s − (s¯ + a + δ))dsW2 +
s¯+2a∫
s¯+ξ
p(s)[ f (s − (s¯ + a + δ))
− f (s − (s¯ + a))]dsW2 − c(s¯ + a + δ)2 + c(s¯ + a)2 ≥ 0.
This is equivalent to
a∫
a−δ
p(s¯ + a + δ + ) f ()dW2 +
s¯+2a−(s¯+a+δ)∫
s¯+ξ−(s¯+a+δ)
p(s¯ + a + δ + )
×[ f () − f ( + δ)]dW2 − c(s¯ + a + δ)2 + c(s¯ + a)2 ≥ 0.
By taking the derivative of the lefthand side at δ = 0, a sufficient condition is
p(a) f (a)W2 −
a∫
ξ−a
p(s¯ + a + ) f ′()dW2 − 2c(s¯ + a) ≥ 0.
unionsq
Proof of Proposition 7 First, note that
U A(e∗i (sˆ∗i ), sˆ∗i , ci ), U A(e∗j (sˆ∗j ), sˆ∗j , c j ) ≥ 0
as the PC is satisfied if the politicians offer the threshold values sˆ∗i , sˆ∗j .
(i) Suppose ci = c j .
Threshold value offers sˆ∗i = sˆ∗j are an equilibrium, because a downward devi-
ation by a politician would yield a zero election probability for him.
Threshold value offers sˆi = sˆ j < sˆ∗i = sˆ∗j and sˆi = sˆ j > sˆ∗i = sˆ∗j cannot be
an equilibrium. They would induce lower effort than e∗i (sˆ∗i ) = e∗j (sˆ∗j ), as the
latter are the highest effort level that can be implemented under the PC. Hence, a
deviation by politician i to a threshold value corresponding to an infinitesimally
higher effort would yield an election probability of one and thus a higher utility
for politician i .
Finally, threshold value offers sˆi < sˆ j ≤ sˆ∗j cannot be an equilibrium either,
because politician i could raise his expected utility by choosing a value sˆi = sˆ j
that would provide him with a positive election probability.
(ii) Suppose ci > c j .
We show that threshold value offers sˆ∗i with a corresponding effort level e∗i (sˆ∗i )
and sˆoj with
sˆoj = arg max
sˆ j
U A(e∗j (sˆ j ), sˆ j , c j ) s.t. e∗j (sˆoj ) ≥ e∗i (sˆ∗i )
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are an equilibrium. First note that U A(e∗j (sˆ
o
j ), sˆ
o
j , c j ) ≥ 0 since by choosing
sˆoj = sˆ∗j U A(e∗j (sˆ∗j ), sˆ∗j , c j ) ≥ 0. Politician j will not be elected if he deviates
to a threshold value corresponding to e∗j (sˆ j ) < e∗i (sˆ∗i ). Thus he chooses the
threshold value that maximizes his utility under the constraint e∗j (sˆ j ) ≥ e∗i (sˆ∗i ).
Politician i will not deviate either, since he cannot offer a higher utility for
voters by selecting other thresholds.
The rest of the proof follows the lines of the proof of (i) and is therefore omitted
here. unionsq
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